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LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION V.
CHEATHON: ERROR OF ALJ IN NOT CITING A
PARTY FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT A HEARING
Kevin J. Riley*
I. Introduction
The power to directly cite for contempt in an administrative
adjudication is not generally vested in an Administrative Law Judge
("AL"). However, ALJ's appointed by federal agencies, and by
agencies of many states, can indirectly exercise contempt power
through a petition to the judiciary. In Cheathon, the Louisiana appellate
court found error when an ALJ ("Referee" in Louisiana) who did have
direct power, failed to exercise it.' This is a unique ruling foi very little
case law exists concerning the exercise of contempt power by ALJ's,
and rarer are reviewing court orders for a contempt citation when none
was issued at the agency level. This note explores this ground breaking
Louisiana case, and discusses administrative contempt power in
general.
II. Statement of the case
A. Background
In a letter dated August 16, 1990, George E. Cheaton2 was
suspended from his job as a Transportation Enforcement Specialist for
the Louisiana Public Service Commission ("LPSC") for allegedly
accepting and soliciting bribes from two Florida-based truckers in lieu
of Mr. Cheaton issuing drivers violation tickets to them. The LPSC
*The author is a third year student at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
'Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Cheathon, 625 So.2d 703 (La. App. 1 st
Cir. 1993), writ denied, 631 So.2d 1166 (La. 1994).2The reported opinion itself refers to the respondent in this case as Cheaton, but
some of the case names refer to him as Cheathon. Where possible th- "Cheaton" spelling
has been used.
terminated Mr. Cheaton following an investigation into the matter.
Cheaton appealed his dismissal to the Louisiana Civi! Service
Commission ("Commission") on September 19, 1990. At the first
hearing, held in February of 1991, both Florida truckers were present,
however Mr. Cheaton failed to appear. The LPSC moved for a
summary dismissal, claiming the truckers were present for
identification testimony, and Mr. Cheaton's absence had prejudiced the
LPSC's case. The Referee denied the motion because Mr. Cheaton had
not been subpoenaed to appear at that hering.
The time allocated for the hearing was spent add; fssing the
issue of appointing authority, with the Referee subsequently ruling that
Mr. Cheaton's dismissal was null and void because it was not effected
by the proper appointing authority. The LPSC appealed to ihe
Commission, which held the Referee had failed to take sufficient
evidence on that issue. The case was remanded to a second hearing.
Mr, Cheaton was then subpoenaed to appear and testify at a
second hearing on August 28, 1991. Once again he failed to appear, and
again the hearing focused exclusively upon the issue of appointing
authority. The Referee again found for Cheaton, and this time the
Commission denied the LPSC's appeal. On appeal to Louisiana
appellate court, the case was remanded to the Commission with a
finding that there had been proper appointing authority.3
Mr. Cheaton's appeal of his termination was scheduled to be
heard before a second Referee, on March 15 and 16, 1994. This Referee
issued a subpoena for Mr. Cheaton to appear and testify on behalf of the
LPSC at the hearing, and the record shows he did receive the subpoena.
Mr. Cheaton again failed to appear on the first day of the
hearing, and the LPSC moved that Mr. Cheaton be held in contempt.
The Referee failed to immediately rule on the motion, and at the end of
the day, the LPSC withdrew its motion of contempt in favor of a
motion to dismiss the appeal based on Mr. Cheaton's failure to appear.
Due to the fact that the day had been devoted to preliminary matters,
the Referee refused to dismiss the appeal based on Cheaton's non-
'Louisiana Public Se, ;ice Commission v. Cheathon, 625 So.2d 703 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1993), Nvrit denied, 631 So.2d 1166 (La.1994).
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appearance, bu, cautioned his attorney that Mr. Cheaton's failure to
appear the next day would be dealt with more severely.
When Mr. Cheaton failed to appear on March 16, the parties
agreed to present a limited amount of evidence in his absence. The
LPSC again moved for dismissal of the proceedings for abandonment,
but the Referee refused to rule on the motion, and rescheduled the
hearing to resume on April 20, 1994. The LPSC appealed this decision
to the Commission which again refused to dismiss Mr. Cheaton's
appeal of his dismissal.
The LPSC again appealed the Commission's decision to the
Louisiana appellate court, and this time the court reversed the decision
of the Referee, and dismissed Cheaton's appeal. The appellate court
also held that the Referee had abused her discretion by failing to
sanction Mr. Cheaton for contempt. The court held that the
Commission erred in its failure to sanction him for his refusal to appear
at any of the three hearings. The court held that the Commission should
have, at a minimum dismissed Cheaton's appeal, and then went on to
assess all costs of the appeal to Mr. Cheaton.
B. Discussion
In determining that the Referee erred in her refusal to dismiss
the appeal, the court looked to "Mr. Cheaton's willful failure to comply
with the subpoena commanding his presence." The appellate court cited
Louisiana statutory authority as vesting Civil Service Referees with
contempt powers for enforcement of their subpoenas.' In this case, Mr.
Cheaton's conduct was so flagrant and willful, that the court required
the Referee to find him in contempt.' This despite a finding that wide
deference was to be afforded a Referee's decision concerning
enforcement of a subpoena.
Louisiana's Civil Service Rules vest the Civil Service
4LA. Civ. SERV. RULE 13.21(a) ("The Commission ... any referee appointed by
the Commission . shall have the power to order the appearance of witnesses...").
5Cheathon, 625 So.2d 703, at 707.
Commission and its Referees with the power to order the appearance of
witnesses, 6 and to sanction violations of its orders by contempt.7 In
addition, an individual may be found by the commission to have
forfeited his office or position by violation of a subpoena. The statutes
only extend these subpoena and contempt powers to "any officer or
employee in the classified service." As an employee of the Louisiana
Public Service Commission, Mr. Cheaton was subject to the subpoena
and contempt powers of the Referee.
Despite having the power to find Cheaton in contempt, the
Referee failed to do so because she applied the wrong standard of
compliance to his actions. The Referee held that since Mr. Cheaton was
never called as a witness, he was not in contempt for failure to appear
as ordered. However, the appellate court held that it was Mr. Cheaton's
failure to appear that subjected him to a contempt ruling.' Regardless
of whether or not he was actually called to testify, Mr. Cheaton violated
the subpoena simply by failing to appear.
While the Referee may have applied an incorrect analysis to Mr.
Cheaton's absence from the hearings, she was still to be afforded wide
discretionary powers in finding contempt. Had Mr. Cheaton's absences
not been so egregious and repeated, the appellate court may have felt
constrained to simply cite the flawed analysis, but let the Referee's
decision stand. However, Mr. Cheaton not only ignored three separate
subpoenas, but also failed to appear after a direct warning from the
Referee. This insolence appeared to induce the appellate court to
reverse the Referee and require a sanction of Cheaton, The court looked
to the willful and flagrant manner in which Cheaton disobeyed the
Commission's subpoena, the repeated nature of his violations, and his
failure to appear in an action brought by him.9 The appellate court held
this an abuse of the wide discretion afforded the Referee concerning
6LA. CIV. SERV. RULE 13.2 1(a).7LA. CIv. SERV. RULE 13.25(a) ("Any officer or employee in the classified service
who willfully refuses or fails to appear before the Commission or its Referee in response to
a subpoena... may be found by the Commission or the Referee to be guilty of contempt in
accordance with these Rules...").
8Cheathon, 625 So.2d 703 at 707.
91d. at 708.
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enforcement of the subpoena. "
Il. Limited ALJ contempt power
In most cases the decision of an ALP is not a final decision, but
merely a recommendation to the agency 2 from which the AL's
authority springs. While in many cases the agency routinely adopts the
decision of the ALJ, there is no final decision until the agency itself
renders one. This lack of final judgment authority, and the fact that
ALJ's are not part of the judicial branch, results in a reluctance to grant
direct contempt power to ALJ's.
Despite many states refusal to grant contempt power to their
administrative judges, a few do grant such power, whether in a general
administrative definition statute, or the more common approach of
vesting contempt power on a statute by statute basis.
A. General discussion of limited contempt power
While there exists only limited case law at the state level
concerning the use of ALJ contempt power, there are statutory grants
of such authority to AL' s in some states. In many jurisdictions
contempt power is only defined in extremely limited terms, however,
some states do provide for broader exercise of this authority. For
example, South Carolina and Texas bestow contempt power to AL's
in statutes which apply this power to administrative judges generally. 3
"Id,
"Throughout the remainder of this note, the terms "AL" and "Administrative
Judge" will be used to describe an administrative agency appointed official empowered to
preside over an administrative adjudication. The many state and federal agencies may label
these officials as; hearing officers, administrative law judges, ALJ's, or referees.
"Unless otherwise noted, the term "agency" will be used when referencing any
statutorily created agency, commission, board, or other administrative office under state or
federal law.
"S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320(d) (1993) ("The administrative law judge division.
. shall have the power to punish as for contempt of court, by fine or imprisonment or both
I [to enforce] any subpoena of the agency."); TEX. Gov'T. CODE § 2003.047(i) (1996)
("An administrative law judge, on the judge's own motion or on motion of a party and after
However, it is far more common for states to grant contempt power to
their administrative law judges on a statute by statute basis."4 These
states only grant this power to specific judges, for certain types of
hearings.' 5
The limited vesting of contempt power is made necessary in
these states for several reasons. Often, a state may have established
administrative adjudication in several different contexts which do not
warrant or require contempt power. This lack of necessity, the
potentially disparate administrative adjudication forums, and due
process concerns, all add to states' reluctance to grant such power. The
latter situation will be dealt with more extensively in a subsequent
section examining contempt power at the federal level.
Some hearings do not require excessive amounts of discovery,
or third party witnesses. In these situations, the absence of a
party/witness simply results in the dismissal of the case, or a summary
decision by the ALJ. Further, if the AU has no power or need to
compel discovery, then the question of contempt power may simply
never have arisen in the legislative history of the statute giving the ALJ
his original authority to hear the case.
Another bar to states' granting of general contempt powers is
the wide range of hearings and adjudications convened by the a
multitude of agencies. As the importance of non-judiciary adjudications
continues to grow, so does the authority granted to the ALJ's of many
state agencies. However, there remain agencies with established
adjudicatory procedures, some of which may not warrant vesting of
direct contempt powers in the AL's conducting these hearings. For
many states, agency inertia is sufficient to prevent the effective passage
of statutes defining administrative law judges in general terms.
notice and opportunity for hearing, may impose appropriate sanctions, ..").
1
4ARGASB, Rule III § J.(2) (1995); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-706 (1995); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 8-43-207 (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN 40-
5-226(14) and (15) (1995).
1 ARGASB, Rule III § J.(2) (1995) (sanctions against foreign attorneys appearing
in Alabamapro hac vice); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-706 (1995) (Workers' Compensation
and related hearings); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4 3-207(l)(p) (1996) (Workers' Compensation
and related hearings); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71 (1995) (environmental self-regulation
hearings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-226(14) and (15) (1995) (family law statutes).
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Both of the above mentioned reasons for limited vesting of AU
contempt power also involve the retention of control by the state
legislatures. This ad hoc method of granting authority provides the
legislatures the ability to adjust their administrative systems as they see
fit. When the need to compel discovery or to enforce subpoenas exists,
the statutes creating the agency has likely already dealt with this issue.
B. Specific statutory grants of contempt power to ALJ's
Seven states explicitly vest contempt power"6, and the majority
of these states (5) only bestow this power when defining specific
administrative proceedings. 7 When contempt power is available, it is
provided to ensure the efficient administration of agency business. The
discussion of state statutes which follows, summarizes AU contempt
power in various states.
In Mississippi, contempt power is available to an administrative
hearing officer in hearings regarding environmental self-evaluation
reports.' 8 In this statute, the limited contempt power exists to prevent
parties from divulging information from these reports, which previously
was ruled to be privileged from reporting requirements. 9 The extent of
this power is for "contempt orders and other sanctions," and is intended
for use against a party or attorney when necessary to ensure compliance
with the privilege ruling.2" The statute bestows the same power on a
16ARGASB, Rule III § .(2) (1995); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-706 (1995); Colo.
Rev. Stat, § 8-43-207(l)(p) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-5-226(14) and (15) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320(d) (1993); TEx. GOV'T. CODE
§ 2003.047(i) (1996).
'
2ARGASB, Rule III § J,(2) (1995); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-706 (1995); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 8-43-207 (1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71 (1995); MONT, CODE ANN. § 40-
5-226(14) and (15) (1995).
"AMiss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71 (1995) ("Discovery and admissibility in evidence of
environmental self-evaluation reports; divulgence or dissemination of information in
reports; exemption from Public Records Act.").
'MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(3)(b) (1995) ("... The court or hearing officer also
may issue such contempt orders and sanctions against the offending party or such party's
legal counsel as may be necessary to ensure compliance.").201d.
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court or a hearing officer, implying that contempt orders includes the
same powers of contempt as a Mississippi court. This limited
application of contempt power is common among the states that grant
this power on an ad hoc basis. This allows the legislature to carefully
craft the scope and effect of the contempt power, and ensure that is
serves the specific purpose for which it is intended.
Arkansas, and Montana both limit the sanctions allowable for
a contempt holding, to monetary fines. In Arkansas, the ALJ in a
Worker's Compensation Commission adjudication can fine up to
$10,000 for contempt, while in Montana an AU conducting a hearing
under the states family law statutes can level contempt fines for up to
$500 for each count.2
Generally, states in this category only direct contempt power
towards the actions of a party to a hearing or adjudication. Of the states
granting limited contempt powers, Alabama alone allows ALJs direct
contempt powers over attorneys' professional misconduct.22 However,
this seeming aberration may be explained by the presence in the statute
of language outlining the rulings and procedures for foreign attorneys
appearing pro hac vice in the state of Alabama. While a departure from
the normal scope of ad hoc contempt power, this statute may be aimed
at resolving a certain problem under distinct circumstances
Even the contempt power at issue in the Cheaton23 was limited
2'ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-706 (1995) (".... then said person or party, at the
discretion of the administrative law judge or the commission, may be found to be in
contempt of the commission and may be subject to a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000)."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-226(14) (1995) ("An affidavit of the facts
constituting a contempt must be submitted to the hearings officer, who shall review it to
determine whether there is cause to believe that a contempt has been committed. If cause is
found the hearings officer shall issue a citation requiring the alleged contemnor to appear
and show cause why the alleged contemnor should not be determined to be in contempt and
required to pay a penalty of not more that $500 for each count of contempt .. "); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-5-226(15) (1995) ("... If the hearings officer finds the alleged contemnor
in contempt, the hearings officer may impose a penalty of not more than $500 for each
count found....").
12 ARGASB, Rule III § J.(2) (1995) ("... If a foreign attorney engages in
professional misconduct during the course of an appearance, the judge or hearing officer or
the administrative agency before which the foreign attorney is appearing may revoke
permission to appear pro hac vice and may cite the attorney for contempt. ..23625 So.2d 703, 707 (1993).
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in its applicability by state statutory and constitutional restrictions. In
In re Lauricella 4 the Louisiana appellate court held that the ALJ had
incorrectly exercised contempt power where the target of the contempt
order was not a member of the Louisiana Civil Service.2" The court held
that the statutory grant of contempt power only extended to those
persons within the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Civil Service
Commission, of which Mr. Lauricella was not.26 In this situation, not
only did the statute limit the ALJ's contempt power, but the Louisiana
Constitution also affected the jurisdiction allowed over the sanctioned
individual."
IV. Due process concerns over non-judiciary contempt
power
Presently, federal ALJ's do not have direct contempt power,
and must petition the district court for the use of contempt sanctions in
enforcing ALJ and agency discovery orders and subpoenas.28 This has
been enforced by numerous appellate courts, with the Supreme Court
refusing to hear the issue as of yet. 9
Federal agencies do routinely take actions which deprive private
parties of property. However, these actions are allowed only as
delegated by Congress.3" While agencies are allowed to exercise some
discretion in their administration of delegated authority,3 they are
allowed this discretion to carry out the "general policy and purpose" of
241n re: Investigation of John L. Lauricella, Jr., 546 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1989).
25ld. at 209.
261d,
21Id.2
'Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976) (" On contest, the court
shall sustain the subpoena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in
accordance with law.").
'ONLRB v. International Medications Systems, Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 11 I5-16 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1712 (1982.) See also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584
F,2d 1018, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U,S. 1071 (1979); United States v.
Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 934-35 (3d. Cir. 1976).
3V W Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
3 'Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
that Congressional Act.32 Even though the ultimate goal of a contempt
citation is to carrying out an Act of Congress, the real purpose is to
carry out an order of the ALJ. Administrative law judges do not make
agency policy, nor do they have authority to render a final decision in
many administrative agencies. Therefore, contempt sanctions have been
argued to be authority delegated to carry out a Congressional Act.
One caveat to this entire due process argument is that the
Supreme Court is loath to overturn a Congressional delegation of
authority, and has not done so for over sixty years.33 Should Congress
decide to vest direct contempt power in the federal administrative law
judges, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would stray from its
long approval of such delegation.
V. Administrative judicial economy through ALJ contempt
power
Despite concerns over due process violations, vesting contempt
power in ALJ's would arguably increase the overall efficiency of
administrative decision-making. These efficiencies would result in
removing extra layers of judicial procedure currently necessary for
enforcement of administrative subpoenas through the judiciary.
Bestowing contempt power upon the AL's would not only ensure that
contempt enforcement realizes a faster turnaround time, but parties
would be less likely to commit the violations of ALJ and agency orders
which might result in contempt citations.
In addition to procedural efficiencies, direct contempt power
would put teeth into administrative adjudications, thwarting the stalling
techniques presently employed by some parties to adjudication. The
present system ensures the parties that there will be considerable delays
in enforcing discovery in administrative adjudications. Where a delay
in production orders can mean thousands or millions in increased
profits, parties could even be encouraged to holdup an adjudication
321d. at 365, citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398
(1940).
"Id. at 366.
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through contempt citations.
A prime example of the potential evils lurking beneath the
present enforcement of ALJ powers of contempt is illustrated by UA W
v. NLRB. 4 In this case the United Automobile Workers ("UAW")
brought suit against Gyrodyne Company ("Gyrodyne") alleging an
unfair labor practice in the dismissal of 30 union members during mion
organization efforts.35 The suit dragged on for seven years while
Gyrodyne refused to produce subpoenaed documents. 6 During this
time, no action could be taken against Gyrodyne for its blatant union
blocking activities because final authority to sanction rested in the
federal courts.3 7 Gyrodyne's efforts to block the union were eventually
supported by the federal system for enforcement of agency subpoenas,
but the delay in justice delivery obviously had serious interim
consequences.
VI. Conclusion
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Cheathon" provides
a rather unusual treatment of ALJ contempt powers for it is rare for a
court to find abuse of discretion in not finding a party in contempt..
However, this case does show that at least one state is willing to
actively enforce contempt powers which are vested in its administrative
agencies. This case provides valuable support for the use of such power
by Referees in Louisiana.
Contempt power is only infrequently bestowed upon AL's in
this country, whether at the state or federal level. The fact that this
power does exist, and has received endorsement by the state and federal
judiciary, shows potential for the increased use of such power. As the
United States seeks to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its
34UAWv. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3Id at 1332.
361d at 1333.
371d at 1347.
625 So.2d 703 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), write denied, 631 So.2d 1166 (La.
1994).
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judicial processes, increased usage of administrative adjudication is
inevitable. If these efficiencies are to be fully realized then judicial
courts will have to be further removed from the process, and ALJ
contempt power given increased autonomy.
